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The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, Senior United States District Judge for the*
District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 08-1478
                              
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HENRY RAUSER,
     Appellant.
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00440
(Honorable James Knoll Gardner)
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 23, 2010
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
and RODRIGUEZ,  District Judge*
(Filed   April 30, 2010 )
                              
OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
RODRIGUEZ, Senior District Judge.
This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence of Henry Rauser
for possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of
That is, “If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the1
record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”  Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (citations omitted).
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21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.   Rauser raises three issues on appeal.  First, whether the District Court erred in
allowing Rauser to represent himself at trial.  Second, whether the District Court erred in
denying Rauser’s motion to suppress the crack cocaine found in a pair of jeans lying on
his bedroom floor.  Third, whether the District Court erred at sentencing when it found
that his offense level was subject to a two level increase.  
I.
Rauser argues that the District Court erred in allowing him to represent himself at
trial because he had exhibited numerous instances of bizarre and irrational behavior that
should have alerted the court that he was not competent to stand trial or not competent to
represent himself at trial or his sentencing.  
A District Court’s factual findings regarding competency are reviewed for clear
error.  United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 1998).   Further, “the trial1
judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who presided over one of [the
defendant’s] competency hearings and his . . . trial[], will often prove best able to make
more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of a
3particular defendant.”  Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (holding that
under a heightened standard, states were permitted to appoint counsel to represent
severely mentally ill criminal defendants who do not possess the mental wherewithal to
self-representation, yet are competent to stand trial).  The Sixth Amendment protects a
defendant’s right to counsel, as well as his right to refuse counsel and represent himself. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975).  Accordingly, a defendant who
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives the right to counsel generally must be
permitted to defend himself at trial.  Id. at 835.  In making that determination, the District
Court should establish that the defendant: (1) has “clearly and unequivocally” asserted his
desire to represent himself; (2) “understands the nature of the charges, the range of
possible punishments, potential defenses, technical problems that [he] may encounter, and
any other facts important to a general understanding of the risks involved”; and (3) is
competent to stand trial.  United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2002).
Prior to allowing Rauser to represent himself, the District Judge held a hearing and
conducted a detailed colloquy.  The District Judge first inquired whether the medication
Rauser was taking would prevent him from thinking clearly during the hearing.  Although
Rauser complained about the way the Bureau of Prisons handled his medication, he
confirmed he was physically and mentally able to think clearly and understand what was
happening in the courtroom.  The District Judge and Rauser then engaged in a lengthy
discussion about his reasons for proceeding pro se and his ability to represent himself,
including his educational background and his familiarity with the legal system and
4criminal proceedings.  Rauser stressed that he had represented himself in six prior
criminal trials (four burglary cases, a harassment case, and a marijuana case), and had
prevailed in two of the cases and one was declared a mistrial.  Rauser also stated that he
was a "jailhouse lawyer" for many inmates, and had his own copies of the federal and
state criminal codes, as well as boxes of case law.  (Suppl. App. 25-26.)  The District
Judge confirmed that Rauser understood the nature of the charge and the maximum
penalty that could be imposed in his case.  The District Judge explained the advantages of
proceeding with counsel, as compared to the dangers of self representation, and stressed
the importance of effective advocacy throughout the process.  The District Judge
explained that experienced counsel could provide invaluable assistance in navigating the
rules of evidence and criminal procedure, as well as pursuing appropriate legal
arguments.  The District Judge counseled Rauser against self-representation: 
I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself, in your own best
interest. You’re not dealing with a harassment case here, you’re dealing
with a case where you could go to prison for your entire life and, so, it’s
important that you have the best possible representation.  And I realize that
in defending yourself in burglary cases, those were serious crimes as well,
but given your prior record and given the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which the Court must compute and must consider -- I am not required to
follow them, but I must consider them -- and given the way your past record
works for computing sentences, that makes this case potentially a
life-imprisonment case if you were convicted.  So, we’re talking very
serious stuff here.  You understand that? 
Rauser acknowledged that he understood the risks and that he knowingly and
voluntarily accepted those risks and wished to represent himself.  Rauser’s counsel stated
that he was prepared to act as standby counsel, and that Rauser was determined to
5represent himself.  The District Judge concluded that Rauser had clearly and
unequivocally asserted his desire to proceed pro se, and understood the nature of the
charges, the range of possible punishments, the potential defenses, the technical problems
he might encounter, and the risks involved with self representation.  The District Judge
also concluded that Rauser was competent to represent himself, and other than noting “the
somewhat bizarre nature of some of the communications,” there was no indication that he
was not competent.  (Suppl. App. 52.)
 Subsequently, Rauser’s stand-by counsel filed a “Motion for Defendant to be
Independently Examined and Transferred to an Appropriate Medical Facility for the
Administration of Necessary Medical Care.”  The District Judge heard the motion and
made factual findings – including that Rauser would not take his heart medication in the
future; that he had written numerous letters to the court and counsel that bordered on the
bizarre; that he had recently cut the front of his throat, wrist, forearms, and hands with a
razor; and made decisions against his counsel’s advice which counsel believed to be
irrational.  At the request of defense counsel and the government, the District Judge
ordered that Rauser be sent to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina, for a
comprehensive medical, psychological, psychiatric, and competency evaluation and
specifically asked the examiners to determine if the defendant was competent to stand
trial and was “physically and medically able” to represent himself at trial.  (Suppl. App.
122.)
The Butner report noted that the DSM-IV-TR defined malingering as "the2
intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological
symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding
work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining
drugs." The DSMIV-TR indicates that malingering should be suspected when: "(1) it
occurs in a medico-legal context, such as forensic examination; (2) there is marked
discrepancy between the person's claimed stress or disability and the objective findings;
(3) there is a lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying with
the prescribed treatment regimen; and (4) there is the presence of Antisocial Personality
Disorder." 
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After a two-and-a-half month evaluation, the mental health staff at Butner
determined that Rauser was not suffering from a severe mental disease or defect, and was
competent to stand trial.  The District Judge summarized the findings of the report at a
competency hearing and found that even though Rauser had been diagnosed as a
“malingerer”  and exhibited certain anti-social personality traits, the doctors concluded he2
was mentally competent and medically able to represent himself.  (Suppl. App. 122-28.)
Rauser raised no objection to the report’s competency conclusion, nor did he
present any medical evidence to contradict its findings.  Defense counsel confirmed that
Rauser was much more lucid than he had been before his stay at Butner: “As an officer of
the Court, I can tell you, he’s much more lucid in my dealings with him now than he was
before he went [to Butner].”  Suppl. App. 124.  The District Court summarized its
findings from the prior competency hearing and found no reason to disturb its conclusion
that Rauser clearly asserted his desire to proceed pro se, and was aware of the risks of
doing so and the range of possible punishments and defenses.  Rauser’s competency had
been confirmed by the evaluation at Butner. 
7At trial, Rauser took a lead role.  He examined witnesses and argued many of the
motions.  Nonetheless, near the end of the defense’s case, Rauser sought to enter a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity.  The request was denied based on the previous finding of
competency.  The court found nothing in Rauser’s performance or conduct to question his
competency.  The court concluded that the findings in the Butner report were
corroborated by Rauser’s behavior during the trial.  Rauser thereafter asked to subpoena
and present medical records in order to demonstrate that he had a history of mental
illness.  The court denied the request because the it was concerned that Rauser was trying
“to subvert these proceedings,” and “was going to use this as his trump card, as his
insurance policy when all else had failed.”  (Suppl. App. 3017.)
The District Judge observed that Rauser’s performance at trial demonstrated his
sanity:
[O]ne only need read the pages and pages of testimony in this case and the
pages and pages of intelligent and logical, albeit repetitious and sometimes
irrelevant, questions asked by Mr. Rauser, as well as his arguments to the
jury, his arguments to the Court, to know that Mr. Rauser is a sane man. Mr.
Rauser can make good and cogent arguments and often does.  They’re not
always on the mark and they’re not always winners but this is not Mr.
Rauser; this is an unsuccessful attempt by Mr. Rauser to appear to be
incompetent for his own purposes of creating a fallback position or an
insurance policy here, should he get convicted by this jury, as evidence that
the judge committed reversible error in not allowing him to change his plea
to one of guilty but insane.   
(Suppl. App. 3220-22.)
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Rauser requested another competency
hearing.  The District Court reevaluated its decision and found that Rauser remained
8“legally competent, legally sane and mentally capable of representing himself and
assisting in his own defense at the trial of this case as well as at his sentencing.”  (Suppl.
App. 668.)
After a review of the record of the proceedings below, this Court finds that clear
error was not committed by the District Judge, who was in the best position to evaluate
Rauser’s capabilities, and went out of his way to do so.
II.
Next, Rauser argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the crack cocaine found in a pair of jeans lying on his bedroom floor in his house.  He
contends that the affidavit of probable cause in support of the search warrant contained
false statements, as neither of the two confidential informants relied upon could be
deemed “reliable.”  Specifically, Rauser argues that the warrant should not have been
approved because there was insufficient information on its face regarding the past
performance of either confidential informant for a judicial officer to adjudge their
reliability.
“This Court reviews the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear
error as to the underlying factual findings and exercises plenary review of the District
Court’s application of the law to those facts.”  United Stated v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336
(3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  Controlled buys have been sufficient to establish
probable cause.  See, e.g., United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2006).  In
any event, a determination of probable cause rests on the totality of the circumstances,
9which may include information provided by reliable informants as well as the personal
knowledge and observation of law enforcement officers.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
230 (1983).
At the hearing on Rauser’s motion to suppress, the detective who submitted the
affidavit of probable cause to obtain the search warrant admitted that one of the
confidential informants relied upon had not been truthful with the police when he
previously told them that he and Rauser had been present at a shooting in Rauser’s house. 
The detective therefore described the informant in the affidavit as “an untested
confidential informant.”  (Suppl. App. 3551.)  Another detective also described the
informant as “untested” because he was not truthful with the police initially, but was
confronted about that before the police had him make a second controlled buy from
Rauser.  Further, this detective knew that the informant was a drug user and therefore did
not deem him “reliable.”
In any event, the police arranged for the informant to make two controlled
purchases of crack cocaine from Rauser.  In each case, the informant was searched before
he entered Rauser’s house and after he left the residence.  Additionally, a detective
independently verified other information provided by the informant regarding Rauser’s
occupancy of the residence and ownership of a particular vehicle.  Rauser’s prior
narcotics convictions from 1979 and 1993 were also included in the affidavit of probable
cause.
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Considering the totality of the circumstances presented to the District Court, the
Court has no reason to invalidate the search warrant validly obtained and executed on
Rauser’s house.
III.
Finally, Rauser has argued that the District Court erred at sentencing, when it
found that his offense level was subject to a two level increase pursuant to section
2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines for possession of a dangerous weapon in
connection with a drug offense.  There were two .50 caliber black powder rifles and a
loaded .44 caliber black powder revolver in Rauser’s bedroom where he was found with
the crack cocaine.  Thus, Rauser’s criminal history category was determined to be a II,
and his offense level 28, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of 87-108 months, with a
mandatory minimum of 120 months.  He was sentenced to 162 months of imprisonment
after the District Court granted the Government’s motion for an upward departure
pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3 on the ground that Rauser’s criminal history category did not
adequately reflect the seriousness of his criminal record. 
Rauser objected to the two-level enhancement, and continues to do so, arguing that
the weapons found hanging on the wall in his bedroom should not have been categorized
as “firearms” or “dangerous weapons” because they were used only for hunting.  The
question of whether a dangerous weapon was possessed in connection with the offense is
reviewed for clear error.  United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Comment 3 to Section 2D1.1(b)(1) states that the two-level increase should be applied
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“unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,” which
even Rauser’s counsel admits is not supported by the evidence presented at trial.  See
Appellant’s Brief at p. 32.  The District Court did not err when it found that Rauser
possessed the weapons to protect his drug business.
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm.
